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Cheating is known to be a potential threat to coope-
ration. We examine the fitness of a cheater allele in an 
asexual-haploid versus a sexual-diploid population us-
ing three different models. The first model depicts small 
cooperative groups in which the altruist and cheater 
are distributed randomly, the second simulates large 
cooperative groups with varying degrees of spatial 
aggregation and the third simulates a hymenopteran 
society with cheater workers. In all the mod ls sex helps 
stabilize cooperation. The results are not affected by 
dominance or recessiveness of the cheater allele. In 
either case, sexual diploidy increases the variance across 
groups and thus enhances group selection. As a result 
sex and cooperation ca oevolve under conditions when 
cooperation offers substantial fitness gains and chea-
ters threaten cooperation. The model predicts that 
cooperation should be more common in sexually repro-
ducing organisms than asexuals. Among organisms 
where diploid as well as haploid life-cycle stages are 
present, cooperation should be seen more commonly 
in the diploid stage. 
EVEN after several decades of theoretical development, all 
the factors and forces behind the evolution of cooperation 
have perhaps not been unearthed. The same can be said 
about evolution of sex. Both the processes are likely to have 
evolved under a variety of selective forces and their inter-
actions in a complex way. Perhaps a number of selective 
forces are yet to be identified and their effects elucidated. 
 A major problem in the evolution of cooperation has 
been the possibility of cheaters exploiting the cooperators. 
Cheaters have been demonstrated in natural populations1,2, 
and shown to enjoy substantial fitness gains over altruistic 
ones2,3. This problem has been modelled and discussed 
extensively1,4–7. The known anti-cheater mechanisms include 
group selection6 or policing8. We suggest here that sexual 
diploidy can enhance the anti-cheater effects of group selec-
tion and thereby help stabilize cooperation. Almost all 
theories for the advantage of sex revolve around genetic 
recombination9,10. Maynard-Smith and Szathmary11 sug-
gest, on the other hand, that recombination may be a later 
stage in the evolution of sex, syngamy without recombi-
nation preceding it. In all the models used below, re-
combination is not a necessary step. Diploidy arising out 
of fusion of two haploid cells or gametes is sufficient to 
give an advantage in cooperation, as the models show. We 
use the word sex here to denote sexual diploidy indepen-
dent of recombination. We model cooperation between cells 
or individuals in three different situations and show that 
over a variety of conditions, sex and cooperation can 
evolve together. 
 The first model considers cooperation in a small group 
of individuals, the number being four in the results shown. 
If the size of the cooperative group is small, chance alone 
can give rise to some groups with a greater proportion of 
altruists and some groups with greater propo tions of chea-
ters. The number of cheaters in these groups is assumed 
to be binomially distributed. In the absence of cooperation, 
each individual has a baseline fitness of one. Complete 
cooperation of all members in a group gives a roup benefit 
of ‘a’. In a mixed group, the benefit of cooperation is de-
cided by the fraction of altruistic individuals. The chea-
ters in a group derive an additional individual benefit ‘b’, 
which is also proportional to the number of altruists in 
the group. Sexuals and asexuals form separate cooperative 
groups in this model. In the sexual population the four 
individuals form two random pairs, mate and divide mito-
tically to form four diploid individuals that engage in the 
group cooperative act. The behaviour of a heterozygote is 
decided by the dominant allele. At the end of the coope-
rative act the diploid cells undergo reduction division. 
The resultant populations disperse randomly again to start a 
new turn of the cycle. From each group the reproductive 
success of a genotype is the product of the frequency of 
the group, the propotion of the allele in that group, the fit-
ness of an individual within a group and the group fitness 
that is a function of the proportion f altruists in that group. 
 Accordingly, when the altruist allele is dominant: 
 
P =d(p4(1 + a) + 4p3q 0.75(1 + a) + 6p2q2 0.5(0.33(1 + 
  0.5a) + 0.67(1 + a)) + 4pq3 0.25(1 + 0.5a)), 
Q = d(4p3q 0.25(1 + a) + 6p2q2 0.5(0.33(1 + 0.5(a + b) +  
  0.67(1 + a))) + 4pq3(0.5(1 + 0.5(a + b) + 0.25(1 + 
  0.5a))) + q4), 
P1 = h(p14(1 + a) + 4p13q1 0.75(1 + 0.75a) +  
   6p12q12 0.5(1 + 0.5a) + 4p1q13 0.25(1 + 0.25a)), 
Q1 = h(4p13q1 0.25(1 + 0.75(a + b)) + 6p12q12 0.5 
    (1 + 0.5(a + b)) + 4p1q13 0.75(1 + 0.25(a + b)) + q14), 
 
where 
p is the proportion of altruist alleles in the sexual populati n, 
q the proportion of cheater alleles in the sexual population, 
p1 the proportion of altruist alleles in the asexual population, 
q1 the proportion of cheater alleles in the asexual population, 
d and h are the fractions of sexuals and asexuals in the total 
population. 
P, Q are the resultant populations of altruists and cheaters 
in the sexual population and P1, Q1 are those in the asexual 
population. They are normalized by dividing by P + Q and 
P1 + Q1 to get the p, q, p1 and q1 for the next generation. d 
and h are normalized similarly. *For correspondence. (e-mail: watve@vsnl.com) 
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 When the cheater allele is dominant, the phenotype ex-
presion changes and the model is modified as follows: 
 
P = d(p4(1 + a) + 4p3q(0.5(1 + 0.5a) + 0.25(1 + 0.5 
  (a + b))) + 6p2q2 0.5(0.33(1 + 0.5a) + 0.67) +  
  4pq3(0.25)), 
Q = d(4p3q 0.25(1 + 0.5(a + b)) + 6p2q2 0.5(0.33(1 + 0.5 
  (a + b) + 0.67)) + 4pq3(0.75) + q4). 
 
The model assumes no fitness difference in the sexual and 
asexual genotypes, except that arising from cooperation 
and cheating. Sex brings about a difference in the pro-
portion of individuals that cheat and thus creates a fitness 
difference. 
 Simulations show that if the group benefit of cooperation 
is moderate to large, cheaters do not go to fixation despite 
individual advantage. This is due to group selection that, 
in this case, may be called dynamic group selection ince 
unlike classical group selection, there is random mixing 
of individuals in the model; nevertheless, selection acts at 
the group as well as individual level. If the group benefits 
of cooperation are too large compared to the benefit of 
cheating, the cheaters quickly become extinct. Once the 
cheaters are extinct, there is no fitness difference between 
sexuals and asexuals and they coexist. If the benefit of
cheating is disproportionately larger than the group benefit 
of cooperation, the altruists become extinct and the sexual 
and asexual cheaters coexist. At comparable values of a 
and b; however, altruists and cheaters coexist sufficiently 
long and under such conditions the sexual population out-
competes the asexual one (Figure 1 a). If the cheater allele 
is recessive, it is not expressed in a heterozygote and there-
fore the proportion of individuals that cheat is much smal-
ler in a sexual population. This confers an advantage to 
the sexual population. Surprisingly, results are similar if 
the cheater allele is dominant. This is likely since the 
cheater allele is expressed more frequently than its allelic 
proportion in a sexual population. The groups in which 
the cheater allele occurs at a higher proportion, fail to 
cooperate and have a smaller group fitness. On the other 
hand, in groups with a small proportion of cheater alleles, 
the cheater phenotype is heterozygous and therefore the 
advantage of cheating is shared by the altruist allele as 
well. Moreover, the disproportionate expression of cheating 
increases the variance in the phenotypic proportions of 
cheaters, which is an ideal situation for group selection to 
operate. As a result, the sexual population experiences a 
steep decline initially. However, the cheaters decline more 
rapidly than the altruis s due to group selection. Follow-
ing decline of the cheater allele, the sexual population 
performs better than the asexual one and eventually pre-
dominates (Figure 1 b). 
 The ratio of group benefit of cooperation to individual 
benefit of cheating influences the outcome of the simula-
tions. Assuming the altruist allele to be dominant, at a/b > 5, 
the cheater becomes extinct fast and then the sexual and 
asexual populations coexist; between 1 and 5, only the 
sexual altruists survive; between 0.1 and 1, altruist and 
cheater coexist in the sexual population and asexuals are 
driven to extinction; between 0.001 and 0.1, only the sexual 
cheaters survive and at a/b < 0.001, the altruists become 
extinct quickly and the sexual and asexual ch aters coexist. 
Assuming the cheater allele to be dominant, at a/b > 3, 
sexual and asexual altruists coexist; between 1 and 3, only 
sexual altruists survive; between 0.01 and 1, the sexual 
altruist and cheater coexist and at /b < 0.01, the sexual 
cheater is the only survivor. 
 Let us now consider the second model. With coopera-
tion among larger groups, if assemblage of individuals is 
random, cheaters invade and go to fixation in both sex-
uals and asexuals. We have shown earlier that if there is 
some level of spatial aggregation, altruist and cheater can 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Population dynamics of sexual and asexual cooperating 
populations in the first model. Proportions of sexual and asexual popu-
lations and pro ortion of altruists in each are shown. Initial frequency 
of all the alleles is equal in the data shown, the end results were in-
sensitive to the initial proportions of sexual and asexual. a, Altruist allele 
being dominant: Expression of cheaters is supressed in heterozygotes 
giving an advantage to the sexual population. The stable population is 
sexual in which the altruist and cheater alleles coexist. Parameters used 
here are a = 1 and b = 1. b, Cheater allele being dominant: Sexual popu-
lation suffers heavy loss initially due to overexpression of cheater in the
population. However, the proportion of altruists in the sexual popu-
lation increases to improve the fitness of the sexual population later on. 
Here a = 1 and b = 0.4. 
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coexist in a stable or stably oscillating proportion6. We 
model here an ‘n’ person cooperation with varying degree 
of spatial aggre ation. Spatial aggregation is generated using 
Matapurkar and Watve algorithm developed for modelling
altruist cheater dynamics in the slime mould, Dictyoste-
lium6. In this model, a number of cells are randomly scat-
tered over a defined area. Each cell takes a few random 
walk steps and divides. This, after a few generations, results 
in a population consisting of partially intermingling clones 
of cells. The degree of intermingling depends upon the 
initial cell density and the number of random walk steps. 
The population is then divided into a number of quadrats 
and the population in a quadrat forms one cooperative 
group. In this algorithm it is possible to control the 
degree of spatial aggregation by varying the number of 
random walk steps. We generalize the Dictyostelium odel 
here, in which the reproductive success of the group as a 
whole is directly pro ortional to the fraction of altruists 
in the group in addition to the baseline success. Similar 
to the first model, we take the baseline success as 1 and 
the benefit of cooperation as a. The cheaters in the group 
get an added advantage b. Asexual and sexual cells in a 
quadrat form two separate cooperative g oups. The group 
fitness of the asexuals is decided directly by the proportion 
of altruists in the group. The sexual population on the other 
hand, undergoes random pairing and mating. The behavi-
our of each heterozygous diploid cell is now decided by 
the dominant allele and the group fitness calculated accord-
ingly. At the end of the cooperative act, the diploid cells 
undergo reduction division. The resultant populations dis-
perse randomly again to start a new turn of the cycle. 
 Simulations show that the sexuals wipe-off the asexuals 
when the relative fitness gain due to cooperation is large 
and the cheaters perpetuate sufficiently long. When the 
random walk steps are few, the distribution of proporti n 
of cheaters in a group is highly aggregated and group selec-
tion drives the cheaters to extinction in both sexual and 
asexual populations. On the other hand, when the cell dis-
persal is close to random and/or the advantage of coopera-
tion is small, the cheaters go to fixation in both the p pu-
lations. In either case, there is no fitness difference between 
sexuals and asexuals once the cheater allele either be-
comes extinct or gets fixed. With moderate levels of aggre-
gation altruists and cheaters coexist6 and under such 
circumstances, sexuals gain a fitness advantage owin  to 
mechanisms similar to the first model (Figure 2). 
 In the third model we depict a typical hymenopteran 
society consisting of a diploid queen who lays eggs; the 
fertilized eggs giving rise to diploid workers and the un-
fertilized ones giving haploid males. The males are solitary 
while the female workers cooperate at various levels. Cer-
tain worker bees and ants are known to lay haploid (male) 
or parthenogenetic diploid (female) eggs12, and these are 
considered in our model to be cheaters. We model the re-
productive success of altruist (A) and cheater (a) alleles 
in a diploid worker society in comparison with a hypotheti-
cal population with haploid workers (Table 1). For simpli-
city of the model, we consider that the cheater workers 
lay o ly haploid eggs. 
 The group benefit of cooperation (g) s obtained in direct 
proportion to the altruists in a colony. The cheater workers 
lay eggs with a frequency h to give haploid males. The 
cost of rearing the cheater workers is shared by the entire 
colony and therefore there is a corresponding reduction 
(i) in the group fitness in proportion to the cheaters. In the 
ypothetical haploid worker society, the fertilized eggs 
are as umed to undergo reduction division before giving 
rise to a worker so that the total gene pool remains the same 
as in the diploid worker society. The next generation fre-
quencies are calculated from Table 1 as illustrated in the 
f llowing two examples. 
 
(i) Homozygous altruist queens coming from a diploid 
worker colony, altruist allele assumed dominant: 
Qxx = mx(1 + a)qxx + (0.5 mx(1 + (mx + 0.5 my) 
    a – 0.5 my c)qxy). 
 
(ii) Cheater haploid males coming from a diploid worker 
colony, altruist allele assumed dominant: 
  
Figure 2. Parameter space over which different genotypes evolve in 
the second model. The number of random walk steps that govern the 
degree of aggregation is on the x-axis. The y-axis denotes the ratio of 
group benefit of cooperation to the individual benefit of cheating. a,
Altruist allele dominant, and b, cheater allele dominant. Interestingly, 
the pattern remains the same although the precise areas of advantage 
change. Simulations began with a population of 100 spores each of sexuals
and asexuals, each having an equal proportion of altruists and cheaters 
distribu ed over an area of 100 × 100 units. 
 
RESEARCH COMMUNICATIONS 
CURRENT SCIENCE, VOL. 87, NO. 1, 10 JULY 2004 98 
My = (1 + mx g – my i) qyy + (1 + (mx + 0.5 my) g – 
   0.5 my i) 0.5 qxy + (1 + (mx + 0.5 my) g – 
   0.5 my i) 0.5 my h qxy + (1 + mx g – my i) my h qyy. 
 
All other frequencies are calculated similarly and then 
normalized as in the first model. 
 The results of the simulation are similar to the first and 
the second models (Figure 3 a and b). Whenever there are 
comparable benefits of cooperation and cheating and the 
altruists and cheaters coexist in the population, the diploid 
worker genotype outcmpetes the haploid one. 
 Sexual diploidy in these models enhances group selec-
tion. This happens even when the cheater allele is domi-
nant, since in groups having smaller proportion of cheaters, 
majority of cheaters are heterozygous and the advantage 
of cheating that they derive is shared equally by the al-
truist allele. Whereas in groups with cheater majority, homo-
zygous altruist is rare and therefore the fitn ss of the entire 
group is small. As a result, cheaters are rapidly driven to 
extinction or exist n proportions much smaller compared 
to the asexual population. The other role sex plays is to 
increase the phenotypic variance across groups and this 
works in both dominant and recessiv  conditions. Increase 
in variance between groups helps group selection. In all the 
models, no fitness difference between the sexual and asex-
ual populations is as umed, except that gained by coope-
ration. Therefore evolution of sex in the model is solely 
due to the altruist cheater dynamics. On the other hand, 
wher ver cooperation stabilizes, sex is the major stabilizing 
force. Under no conditions can the asexual altruist alone 
stabilize. Similarity of results in all the models demon-
strates the generality and robustness of this principle. 
 The results of all the models suggest that sex helps  
stabilize cooperation and therefore cooperation can be 
expected to be more frequent in sexual species. On the 
oth r hand, the need for cooperation can act as a selective 
force for the evolution of sex. Both sex and cooperation 
ar  multidimensional processes and a variety of selective 
forces must be involved in their evolution. The model  
is not incompatible with any of the existing models for 
the ev lution of sex as well as cooperation. Cooperation  
is certainly not the sole driving force behind evolution  
and maintenance of sex and vice versa. The interaction  
of the two processes, neverthless, could have helped 
stabilize both. 
 Two testable predictions of the model are (i) altruism 
should be seen more frequently in sexually reproducing 
organisms compared to asexually reproducing organisms, 
Table 1. Proportion and fitness of altruist (A) and cheater (a) alleles in a hymenopteran society; 1b the workers are  
assumed to be haploid arising after meiosis in fertilized eggs 
    
    
Altruist dominant – workers diploid 
        
 Parental Queen 
        
  AA 
 (qxx) 
Aa 
(qxy) 
aa 
(qyy) 
        
Workers     AA    Aa 
    (mx)     (my) 
 AA      Aa     aa 
(0.5 mx) (0.5 mx (0.5 my) + 0.5 my) 
 Aa     aa 
(mx)   (my)  
Progeny queens      AA    Aa 
    (mx)      (my) 
 AA     Aa     aa 
(0.5mx) (0.5 mx (0.5 my) + 0.5 my) 
 Aa     aa 
(mx)    (my)  
Progeny males     A 
   (qxx) 
  A         a 
(0.5 qxy)      (0.5 qxy) 
  A 
(qyy)  
Males from cheater workers     0   A 
(0.5 my) 
 A 
(my)  
Group fitness     (1 + g) 1 + (mx + 0.5*my)*a – (0.5*my*i)) 1 + mx*a – my*I 
        
Altruist dominant – workers haploid (after meiosis in fertilized eggs) 
        
 Parental Queen 
        
 AA 
(qxx) 
Aa 
(qxy) 
aa 
(qyy) 
        
Workers     A              a 
(0.5 + 0.5 mx)  (0.5 my) 
   A       a 
(0.25 + 0.5mx)  (0.25 + 0.5my) 
  A     a 
(0.5 mx) (my + 0.5 mx)  
Progeny queens  AA   Aa 
(mx)  (my) 
  AA      Aa        aa 
(0.5mx) (0.5mx (0.5my) + 0.5my) 
 Aa  aa 
(mx) (my)  
Progeny males  A 
(qxx) 
  A         a 
(0.5*qxy) (0.5*qxy) 
 A 
(qyy)  
Males from cheater workers (0.5 my) (0.75my + 0.25mx) (my + 0.5 mx)  
Group fitness 1 + (0.5 + 0.5*mx)*g – (0.5*my*i) 1 + (0.25 + 0.5*mx)*g – (0.25 + 0.5*my)*i 1 + 0.5*mx*g – (0.5*mx + my)*i 
    
    
mx, Proportion of A males; my = Proportion of a males; x, Proportion of A alleles in queens and y, Proportion of a alleles in queens. Initially, 
Qxx = x2, Qxy = 2xy and Qyy = y2. The new generation proportion of males and queens is calculated by multiplying the probabilities of each 
genotype by the group fitness and normalizing. Only the altruist dominant ca e is show . 
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*For correspondence. (e-mail: ) 
and (ii) among organisms which have diploid and haploid 
stages in their life cycle, cooperati n should be more com-
mon in the diploid stages than the haploid ones. Just a few 
examples of altruism, cooperation or eusociality are known 
among predominantly asexual taxa, particularly prokaryotes. 
The renewed interest in the social life of microorganisms 
might bring out a number of novel examples of cooperation 
in bacteria13. At this stage, therefore, the available data are 
inadequate to test the first prediction quantitatively. Among 
the well-known examples of sociality in microorganisms are 
fruiting body formation in Myxobacteria and slime moulds. 
In both the examples, cheaters h ve been shown to occur 
frequently in natural populations (Watve, M. G., unpub-
lished)1–3. Sexual reproduction is not known in Myxobac-
teria, but is known to occur in Dictyostelium14. Studies on 
sexual reproduction in Dictyostelium are scanty, but appa-
rently the ratio of cells sacrificed per spore produced is 
much larger in sexual spore formation compared to asexual 
spore formation14. In basidiomycetes and ascomycetes, more 
complex stages showing a greater degree of division of 
labour among cells and a greater proportion of sterile cells 
are diploid and the simpler stages haploid. These examples 
fit well into the predictions of the model, qualitatively.  
It is difficult to test the prediction quantitatively with 
available data. However, the picture in hymenopterans is 
clearcut, in that all cooperative stages are necessarily 
diploid, while no haploid stage is known to coperate. 
 Another speculation arising out of the model is that 
primitive multicellularity might have been similar to that 
seen in cellular slime moulds, where polyclonal coopera-
tion could be inevitable. This might have been the right 
situation for sex and cooperation to coevolve leading to an 
association between multicellularity and sex. Such an asso-
ciation might have persisted in spite of the nature of 
multicellularity as well as that of sex changing in the course 
of evolution. As a result, the unicellular taxa are pre-
dominantly asexual and the multicellular ones have a 
large proportion of sexually reproducing species. 
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Rule-based systems are widely being used in decision 
making, control systems and forecasting. In the real 
world much of the knowledge is imprecise, uncertain, 
ambiguous and inexact in nature. Fuzzy logic offers a 
better way to represent complicated situations in terms 
of simple natural language. 
 Here an attempt has been made to develop a rule-
base for prediction of direct action avalanches of 
Chowkibal–Tangdhar road axis (Jammu and Kashmir) 
in Indian Himalaya using fuzzy logic. The conditio  
 
Figure 3. Parameter space (denoting group benefit of cooperation on 
the x-axis and individual benefit of cheating on the y-axis) over which 
different genotypes evolve in the third model. a, Altruist allele domi-
nant and b, cheater allele dominant. Like the second model, the patterns 
are similar in both altruist and cheater dominant cases, although the 
underlying mechanisms are different. 
 
